Policy and regulation

Bank lobbying, never really went away!

From the Global Association of Risk Professionals, comes this story….

(Bloomberg) — The world’s largest banks are into the home stretch of a long campaign to convince politicians and regulators that planned changes to their capital requirements will suffocate the industry and imperil lending and growth. All that lobbying is paying off when it counts.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision holds three crucial meetings in the next two weeks as it races to wrap up the post-crisis capital framework by the end of the year. The banks warn that proposed changes in how they assess risk would send capital requirements spiraling, and key policy makers from Europe to Japan are heeding their message.

The banks’ lobbying success was on display this week. Andreas Dombret said the Bundesbank, where he’s in charge of financial supervision, had considered the industry’s arguments and concluded that “there is a need to recalibrate” the Basel proposals. The European Union’s top two officials then insisted in a position paper before the Group of 20 summit Sept. 4-5 that the Basel Committee stick to its promise not to increase capital requirements significantly as it refines risk measurement.

“The banks feel that there is a tactical opening right now for the politicians to deliver a more favorable outcome than what has resulted so far from the technocratic process,” said Nicolas Veron, a senior fellow at the Bruegel think tank in Brussels. “Banks in different markets and geographies have differing objectives, but there is coordination.”

Click here to read more….

Requiem for Regulation

So says Simon Johnson about the JOBS bill (HERE) and many others everywhere. The CFA is against it. Lawyers, IPO experts, SEC accountants are against it. Click HERE for SEC Chief Accountant Turner’s testimony to a Senate Committee. Clearly, we have not learnt anything.  And say one for Trayvon Martin, a situation which points to what nonsensical legislation can do.

Robotic finance!

An excerpt from a Harvard Business Review article (which itself is a piece from a book by Prof. Bhide) talks about the consequences of automating many finance decisions, in particular mortgages….

The traditional lending model was built around case-by-case judgment. Home buyers would apply for loans from their local bank, with which they often had an existing relationship. A banker would review each application and make a judgment, taking into account what the banker knew about the applicant, the applicant’s employer, the property, and conditions in the local market. The banker would certainly consider history—what had happened to housing prices, and the track record of the borrower and other similarly situated individuals. But good practice also required forward-looking judgments—assessments of the degree to which the future would be like the past. Dialogue and relationships were also important: Bankers would talk to borrowers to ascertain their beliefs and intentions. And staying in touch after the loan was made facilitated judgments about adjusting terms when necessary.

Over the past several decades, centralized, mechanistic finance elbowed aside the traditional model. Loan officers made way for mortgage brokers. At the height of the housing boom, in 2004, some 53,000 mortgage brokerage companies, with an estimated 418,700 employees, originated 68% of all residential loans in the United States. In other words, fewer than a third of all loans were originated by an actual lender. The brokers’ role in the credit process is mainly to help applicants fill out forms. In fact, hardly anyone now makes case-by-case mortgage credit judgments. Mortgages are granted or denied (and new mortgage products like option ARMs are designed) using complex models that are conjured up by a small number of faraway rocket scientists and take little heed of the specific facts on the ground.

The securitization and sale of mortgages has meant that financial companies’ loan origination is no longer limited by their deposit base or capital, allowing some institutions to capture a very large share of the market. Countrywide Financial, which was started in 1969, grew from a two-man operation into a mortgage behemoth with approximately 500 branches. Before it imploded, in 2007, it was issuing nearly a fifth of all U.S. mortgages. The government/private hybrids Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac made Countrywide’s role seem small. When they were taken over by the Treasury, in 2008, the two enterprises owned or had guaranteed about half of the country’s $12 trillion worth of outstanding mortgages. Since then, their share of the market has only gone up.

The buyers of securitized mortgages don’t make case-by-case credit decisions, either. For instance, buyers of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac paper weren’t, and still aren’t, making judgments about the risk that homeowners would default on the underlying mortgages. Rather, they were buying government debt—and earning a higher return than they would from Treasury bonds. Even when securities weren’t guaranteed, buyers ignored the creditworthiness of individual mortgages. They relied instead on the models of the wizards who developed the underwriting standards, the dozen or so banks (the likes of Lehman, Goldman, and Citicorp) that securitized the mortgages, and the three rating agencies that vouched for the soundness of the securities.

Dispensing with judgment has also helped funnel the mass production of derivatives into a few mega-institutions, posing systemic risks that their top executives and regulators cannot control. (See the sidebar “Derivatives for Robots.”)

Sidebar Icon Derivatives for Robots

The fallout.

Little good has come of this robotization of finance. Reduced case-by-case scrutiny has led to the misallocation of resources in the real economy. In the recent housing bubble, lenders who, without much due diligence, extended mortgages to reckless borrowers helped make prices unaffordable for more prudent home buyers.

The replacement of ongoing relationships with securitized, arm’s-length contracting has fundamentally impaired the adaptability of financing terms. No contract can anticipate all contingencies. But securitized financing makes ongoing adaptations infeasible; because of the great difficulty of renegotiating terms, borrowers and lenders must adhere to the deal that was struck at the outset. Securitized mortgages are more likely than mortgages retained by banks to be foreclosed if borrowers fall behind on their payments, as recent research shows.

When decision making is centralized in the hands of a small number of bankers, financial institutions, or quantitative models, their mistakes imperil the well-being of individuals and businesses throughout the economy. Decentralized finance isn’t immune to systemic risk; individual financiers may follow the crowd in lowering down payments for home loans, for instance. But this behavior involves a social pathology. With centralized authority, the process requires no widespread mania—just a few errant lending models or a couple of CEOs who have a limited grasp of the risks taken by subordinates.

A cynical Michael Lewis piece on Fin Reform. Try to read everything he writes.

Shorting Reform

By MICHAEL LEWIS
Published: May 28, 2010
To: Wall Street chief executives

From: Your man in Washington

Re: Embracing the status quo

Our earnings are robust, our compensation has returned to its naturally high levels and, as a result, we have very nearly regained our grip on the imaginations of the most ambitious students at the finest universities — and from that single fact many desirable outcomes follow.

Thus, we have almost fully recovered from what we have agreed to call The Great Misfortune. In the next few weeks, however, ill-informed senators will meet with ill-paid representatives to reconcile their ill-conceived financial reform bills. This process cannot and should not be stopped. The American people require at least the illusion of change. But it can be rendered harmless to our interests.

To this point, we have succeeded in keeping the public focused on the single issue that will have very little effect on how we do business: the quest to prevent taxpayer money from ever again being used to (as they put it) “bail out Wall Street.”

As we know, we never needed their money in the first place, and by the time we need it again, we’ll be long gone. If we can keep the public, and its putative representatives, fixated on the question of whether their bill does, or does not, ensure there will be no more bailouts, we may entirely avoid a discussion of our relationship to the broader society.

Working together as a team we have already suppressed debate on many dangerous ideas: that those of us deemed too big to fail are too big and should be broken up, for instance, or that credit default swaps and collateralized debt obligations and other financial inventions should simply be banned. We are now at leisure to address the few remaining threats to our way of life. To wit:

1. Washington will attempt to limit our ability to exploit the idiocy of institutional investors a k a our “customers.” The Senate appears intent on forcing our most lucrative derivatives business onto open exchanges, where investors can, for the first time, observe the prices we give them. This measure — which I’ve come to call the “Making the World Safe for Germans With Money Act” — will prove difficult to defeat. Our public strategy here, as elsewhere, must be to complicate the issue.

To the mere mention of open, public exchanges for derivatives, you should always respond, “That will destroy liquidity in these fragile and complex markets.” Most people don’t even know what “liquidity” means, or what causes it or why they actually need to have more rather than less of it — or what, even, the point is of a market that requires privacy to operate. They will assume that you must understand it better than they do. For that reason alone it is useful.

The other point you should make to our elected officials (privately, please) is that our profits function as a fixed point in an uncertain universe. If they curtail our ability to shaft German investors in one way, we will simply find some other way to do it.

Shockingly, the Senate version of the bill more or less would require us to cease to trade derivatives entirely. This unpleasant idea was introduced by Senator Blanche Lincoln of Arkansas, and it leads me to a point that is worth underscoring: We do not have a problem with the American people, we have a problem with American women. Elizabeth Warren, our TARP supervisor, continues to ask questions about what we did with our government money; Mary Schapiro has used her authority at the S.E.C. to sue Goldman Sachs. Of the four Republican senators who crossed over to vote with the Democrats, two were women — and one of the guys posed naked for Cosmopolitan magazine.

Going forward, we should discourage women from seeking higher office — or indeed, any position in which they might exert influence over our activities. More immediately, in your private conversations with Larry Summers, Tim Geithner and male Republican senators, you should simply refer to Blanche Lincoln as “unhinged.” They’ll get it.

2. Our slow cousins at Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s are likely to suffer a blow to their already lowly status. They are virtually certain to be stripped of their designation as Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations. Whatever that means, it presents no threat to our way of life. Just the reverse: the more miserable it is to work at Moody’s, the less capable (and more manipulable) Moody’s employees will be.

The lone remaining risk to the status quo is the Franken amendment — introduced by Senator Al Franken of Minnesota — which would prevent us from personally selecting the ratings agencies that offer opinions on our offerings. It creates a board inside the Securities and Exchange Commission to assign ratings agencies, thereby removing the direct incentive the raters have to please us. (Of course, it preserves their indirect incentive: that is, that we might one day offer them jobs.)

The Franken amendment thus gums up what has been heretofore a very cleanly rigged system. In addition to encouraging public references to Stuart Smalley and Mr. Franken’s other theatrical embarrassments, we should remind our friends on Capitol Hill and in the press that “the Franken amendment will give the federal government the same control over finance it has seized in health care.”

3. There is a slight, but real, risk that public opinion will yank us in some unexpected direction. Over the past few months, a curious pattern has emerged: the more open the debate, the more radical the outcome.

In private, reasonable discussions we were able to persuade our friends in the Senate to prevent votes on amendments hostile to our interests — the worst of which, I might add, was dreamed up by yet another female senator. But the minute a vote was held, and senators sensed the cameras watching, even our friends abandoned us to the mob. All of these people are continually engaged in the same mental calculation: are the votes I might gain with this remark or this idea or this position greater than the votes I can buy with the money given to me by Wall Street firms? With each uptick in the level of public scrutiny — with every minute of televised debate — our money means less.

In the short term, we must do whatever we can to dissuade Representative Barney Frank from allowing any part of these discussions between senators and representatives to be televised. In the longer term we must return to the shadows. Do your work in private; allow your money to speak for you; and remember, the only way we’ll get the financial reform we need is if we pay for it. No one else can afford it.